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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates whether the 2007-2009 recession impacted the capital structures of U.S. 
corporations.  Investigating all non-financial firms in the S&P 500 Index, the study finds that by 
boosting their book equity via dividend cuts and some debt reductions, firms kept book leverage 
unchanged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 vast body of knowledge on the theory and practice of capital structure has emerged starting with 
Modigliani and Miller‟s (1958) formal theory of capital structure that postulates that there could not 
be a single optimal capital structure in perfect markets.  They argue that, in the absence of market 
imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs, asymmetric information, agency costs, and bankruptcy costs, the 
firm‟s cost of capital is determined by the firm‟s investments and that it is not possible for a firm to lower its cost of 
capital by simply changing its debt-equity mix.   
 
Researchers since Modigliani and Miller have concluded that market imperfections can and do create 
opportunities for the firm to lower its cost of capital by changing its capital structure mix.  Tax deductibility of 
interest expense, for example, is a strong incentive for a firm to use debt in lieu of equity to lower the overall cost of 
capital.  However, the existence of substantial bankruptcy costs deters managers from overusing debt.  This results 
in an optimal capital structure according to the proponents of the trade-off theory, with firms employing a debt-
equity mix that minimizes overall cost of capital.  The pecking order theory, on the other hand, uses information 
asymmetry to explain the managers‟ choice of a capital structure.  According to this theory, managers will prefer 
borrowing to selling new equity for the fear that the sale of new equity will be perceived as a signal that the stock is 
overvalued.  Thus, there is no optimal capital structure; however, the theory predicts a definitive managerial 
preference for internal funds, followed by debt and then new equity, in that order (Meyers and Majluf, 1984).  
Lastly, the market timing theory of capital structure argues that capital structure decisions are the cumulative 
outcomes of managers‟ attempts to time the equity market; managers will sell new equity in times of high valuations 
and buyback stock and/or borrow in times of low valuations (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  Levy and Hennessy (2007) 
arrive at the same conclusion as Baker and Wurgler by using the agency theory argument: Firms will use more debt 
during economic contractions to maintain managers‟ relative ownership and will use more equity during economic 
expansions.   
 
In 2008, the world economies experienced one of the worst recessions in history.  In the U.S., the recession 
officially started, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, in December 2007 and ended in June 
2009.  The recession has hit financial firms the hardest, resulting in hundreds of bank failures.  Although some non-
financial firms declared bankruptcies, many who didn‟t resorted to layoffs, dividend cuts, and general business 
downsizing to survive.  There is general consensus that many factors were responsible for this recession, including 
the Fed‟s expansionary monetary policy, lax corporate control, regulatory and rating agencies‟ failures, and 
excessive corporate leverage.  It is generally conceded that many financial firms used excessive financial leverage 
prior to the recession.  This study addresses the question of whether non-financial firms changed their financial 
leverage following the recession.  There is anecdotal evidence that U.S. firms have been active in both the debt and 
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equity markets to rebalance their capital structures.  Two competing forces have been at work.  First, due to the 
contraction in aggregate demand, firms had incentives to cut their fixed costs including interest expense and beef up 
their balance sheets by using more equity financing, including retained earnings.  On the other hand, due to the 
quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve Bank resulting in historically low interest rates, firms found it very 
attractive to borrow.  
 
This study computes multiple measures of corporate leverage at two time periods, December 2007, and 
December 2009, to determine any shifts in corporate financing policies as a result of the “great recession.” 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 No single theory of capital structure is able to explain the cross-sectional and time series variances. Extant 
evidence suggests that leverage is related to profitability, market-to-book, firm size, asset tangibility, and industry 
leverage in a manner consistent with one or more of the capital structure theories discussed above.  In general, 
studies have found evidence in support of the trade-off theory (Frank and Goyal; 2009), the market timing theory 
(Baker and Wurgler; 2002), the pecking order theory (Bharath, Pasqueriello, and Wu; 2009), and the agency theory 
(Levy and Hennessy; 2007).  In addition Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) found that the above theories at best 
have limited power to explain the variation in corporate capital structures.  Lemmon et al. found that corporate 
capital structures are stable over long periods of time and that firms that have high (low) leverage tend to remain so 
for over 20 years.  Moreover, evidence suggests that firms do not appear to adjust their capital structures quickly.  
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND STUDY DESIGN 
 
 The study sample comprises all 419 non-financial firms that are part of the S&P 500 Index.  Financial firms 
are typically excluded in capital structure studies due to the regulated nature of their capital structures.  Bloomberg 
data on the sample firms are used to perform analyses presented in this study.   
 
 This study tests to see whether the 2007-2009 recession encouraged managers to change corporate capital 
structures.  Further tests are conducted to detect underlying shifts in the relative use of the three means of financing, 
retained earnings, new debt, and new equity.   The predictions of the pecking order theory and the market timing 
theory are in the same direction.  The recession caused severe across-the-board declines in stock prices.  The S&P 
500 provided a negative return of approximately 39% in the calendar year 2008.  A recession and accompanying 
stock price declines may exacerbate asymmetric information so that managerial preference for retained earnings 
may be more pronounced.  Therefore, a finding of greater use of retained earnings and/or debt following an 
economic contraction will be consistent with the pecking order theory.   The average prime rate in 2009 fell to 
3.25% from about 8% in 2007 and 5.2% in 2008.  Given a severe contraction in stock prices, the market timing 
theory predicts stock buybacks and/or greater use of debt to minimize the cost of capital.  The trade-off theory‟s 
prediction, however, is ambiguous.  The recession likely increased the potential bankruptcy costs for U.S. firms 
resulting in a shift away from debt.  On the other hand, the reduction in borrowing rates increased the attractiveness 
of debt.  A finding of no significant change in capital structures will be consistent with the previous findings of 
stable capital structures over time and/or slow adjustments.   
 
 Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), the following variable values are estimated for 2007 (pre-recession) 
and 2009 (post-recession) and t tests are performed to see if the financial leverage changed from 2007 to 2009.  
Further tests are conducted to test the predictions of various theories discussed above.  In particular, it is investigated 
whether changes in financial leverage are associated with any significant issue/buyback of stock/debt and changes in 
retained earnings.   
 
Book equity = Total assets – total liabilities – preferred stock + deferred taxes   
Book leverage = (Total assets – book equity)/Total assets 
Market leverage = (Total assets – book equity)/(Total assets – book equity + market equity) 
Market value/Book value = (Total assets – book equity + market equity)/Total assets 
Net equity issue = (Change in book equity – change in retained earnings)/Total assets 
Net retained earnings = Change in retained earnings/Total assets 
Net debt issue = (Change in total assets – change in book equity – change in retained earnings)/Total assets 
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EVIDENCE 
 
 As the mean value for the market to book ratio (a measure of available investment opportunities and 
relative valuation) indicates in Table 1, there was a highly significant contraction in stock prices in the 2007-2009 
period.  As a result market leverage rose significantly; however, there was no noticeable change in book leverage.  
This is due to the fact that while the market leverage measure is influenced greatly by the firm‟s stock price, the 
book value measure is affected by the accounting value of equity, including dividend changes (negative and highly 
significant) and  change in retained earnings (positive and highly significant).  It must be noted that both measures 
also reflect the impact of net debt issue (negative and marginally significant) and new equity issues (the sign is 
positive but insignificant).  The data indicate that firms, when faced with a severe contraction in aggregate demand 
and the resulting lower cash flows, boosted their retained earnings by reducing dividend payments and debt 
obligations. 
 
 
Table 1 
Mean values for leverage-related variables for 2007 and 2009 and t-statistics for mean differences.  The sample consists of 
419 non-financial firms in the S&P 500 Index. 
Variable 
2007 
Mean 
2009 
Mean 
t-statistic for Mean 
Difference(2009-2007) 
Market to Book 2.29 1.88 -7.21** 
Book Leverage 0.56 0.57 0.46 
Market Leverage 0.32 0.37 14.54** 
Book equity $12,184 million $9,185 million -0.92 
New Equity Issue -0.25 0.01 1.03 
Net Retained Earnings 0.01 0.04 4.62** 
Dividend Payment 0.03 0.02 -4.34** 
Net Debt Issue 0.31 -0.03 -1.34* 
*Significant at the 10% confidence level in a one-tailed test. 
**Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
 
 
The above evidence is in line with Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) who report stable corporate 
capital structures over long periods.  The evidence is also consistent with the pecking order theory, which predicts 
that dividend decisions are „residual‟ decisions in the sense that managers distribute the residual cash balance after 
exhausting their investment opportunities.  The marginally significant change in net debt may indicate the presence 
of bankruptcy costs and the managers‟ desire to roll back their leverage.  To summarize, to counter the shrinkage in 
book value of equity due to the recession, managers cut back on dividend payments and simultaneously reduced net 
debt.  The cumulative effect of all of these changes was no change in the overall book leverage. 
 
 The data were segregated by industry to investigate whether the overall findings reported above are 
uniform across all nine industries represented in S&P 500.  As Table 2 indicates, market leverage rose significantly 
across all industries, while book leverage rose in three industries - materials, industrials, and consumer discretionary 
(marginal increase) - and marginally declined in utilities.  The industries with increased book leverage were affected 
by the recession more than other industries and were unable to maintain their pre-recession leverage levels despite 
cuts in dividends and debt levels.  There is also weak evidence of stock buybacks in the materials and industrials 
industries.  The utilities industry was the only industry to reduce book leverage, although marginally, through a 
simultaneous issue of equity and reduction in dividends and debt. 
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Table 2 
Average change in leverage-related variables by industry from 2007 to 2009.  t-statistics for mean differences are 
presented in parentheses.  The sample consists of 419 non-financial firms in the S&P 500 Index. 
 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
New equity 
Issue 
New 
Retained 
Earnings 
Dividend 
Payment 
New Debt 
Issue 
Energy -0.02 
(-0.84) 
0.08 
(6.01**) 
-0.01 
(-0.34) 
-0.05 
(-4.77**) 
-.01 
(-4.5**) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
Materials 0.04 
(2.75**) 
0.07 
(5.95**) 
-0.03 
(-1.59*) 
-0.012 
(-0.89) 
-0.01 
(-1.47*) 
-0.03 
(-0.97) 
Industrials 0.03 
(2.49**) 
0.08 
(9.18**) 
-0.01 
(-1.70*) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.01 
(-2.26**) 
-0.08 
(-3.97) 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0.02 
(1.61*) 
0.04 
(3.98**) 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
0.07 
(4.30**) 
-0.01 
(-2.47) 
-0.12 
(-4.74**) 
Consumer 
Staples 
0.04 
(1.25) 
0.06 
(3.90**) 
2.62 
(1.02) 
0.03 
(1.62*) 
-0.00 
(-0.33) 
-2.67 
(-1.05) 
Healthcare 0.03 
(1.17) 
0.08 
(5.04**) 
0.02 
(1.35*) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.01 
(-3.24**) 
-0.04 
(-1.50*) 
Information 
Technology 
-0.01 
(-0.50) 
0.03 
(3.72**) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
0.09 
(3.95**) 
-0.00 
(-1.34*) 
-0.14 
(-4.03**) 
Telecommunication 
Services 
0.04 
(0.91) 
0.13 
(4.32**) 
0.06 
(1.08) 
0.06 
(0.95) 
-0.00 
(-0.41) 
-0.06 
(-0.64) 
Utilities -0.01 
(-1.36*) 
0.07 
(7.72**) 
0.02 
(1.91**) 
0.01 
(1.17) 
-0.01 
(-5.92**) 
-0.04 
(-1.91**) 
*Significant at the 10% confidence level in a one-tailed test. 
**Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This study investigated whether the 2007-2009 recession caused a significant shift in corporate leverage.  
Examining the 419 non-financial firms comprising the S&P 500 Index, indicates a significant increase in market 
leverage due to stock price declines but no significant shift in book leverage.  Corporations in general were able to 
maintain their pre-recession level of book leverage by offsetting the reduced book value of equity due to the 
recession-induced losses with reduced dividends and debt levels.  This evidence shows that managers actively 
manage their capital structures.  It is conjectured that the above managerial actions and higher stock prices over time 
will likely restore the pre-recession level of market leverage.   
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